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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

22 SEPTEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 38)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 13 - 19 SEPTEMBER 1971

Moscow (2872 items)

Afghan King in USSR	(--)	7%
China	(10%)	7%
Brandt-Brezhnev Talks	(--)	6%
Indochina	(3%)	4%
World Disarmament	(2%)	3%
Conference Proposal		
West Berlin Accord	(11%)	3%
Middle East	(1%)	2%

Peking (1407 items)

Domestic Issues	(31%)	40%
Indochina	(10%)	23%
[Cambodia	(4%)	10%]
[Vietnam	(4%)	9%]
Korean Item on UN Agenda	(--)	9%
Japan	(2%)	8%
[40th Anniversary of	(--)	3%]
Japan Action in		
Manchuria		
DPRK National Day	(18%)	3%
Chilean Independence Day	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

In the first Vietnamese communist comment on the Paris talks since the end of July, a NHAN DAN Commentator article on 21 September says that neither the replacement of Bruce by Ambassador Porter nor "recent statements" by the President have indicated any change in the U.S. attitude. Commentator spells out points one and two of the PRG's 1 July seven-point proposal and complains that the Nixon Administration "has always said no to this correct and well-meaning stand." Vietnamese communist media carried the standard, cursory account of the 16 September session of the Paris talks. And there is no acknowledgment of Ambassador Porter's attempts to get the communist delegates to confirm or deny reports--by Americans who have interviewed them--that the matter of U.S. troop withdrawal and the release of prisoners can be dealt with separately from the question of a political settlement in South Vietnam.

Moscow continues routinely to accuse the United States of procrastinating at the Paris talks and of refusing to answer the PRG peace proposal. At the same time Moscow, continues to publicize its aid to Vietnam, reviewing economic and military aid provided over the years and calling attention to current relief aid being sent in connection with the floods in the DRV.

The heavy U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam on 21 September are condemned in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 22d--the first protest at that level since March of this year. The statement appeals to the socialist countries as well as U.S. and world public opinion "to resolutely struggle to check the Americans' criminal hands."

Hanoi propaganda on the 10-18 September visit of a high-level Japanese Communist Party delegation to the DRV avoided the anti-Chinese polemical themes that had marked North Vietnamese propaganda in July and August following the announcement of President Nixon's planned visit to Peking. Polemical remarks by the delegation head, party Chairman Kenji Miyamoto, were omitted in Hanoi's reports, and the joint communique released at the close of the visit does not even bring up the issue of world communist unity or the principle of the independence of individual parties.

DRV, PRG SCORE THE PRESIDENT, PORTER FOR NEGOTIATIONS STANCE

After an avoidance in Hanoi media of any reference to Ambassador Porter except in the VNA account of the 9 September Paris session

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when he first participated, a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 21st says that the conference has not been moved forward either by his taking over from Ambassador Bruce or by the President's "recent statements." As broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service, the article says that no change in the U.S. attitude or policy has been apparent since the new chief negotiator took over, and it adds cryptically that at the 9 September session Porter proposed holding restricted meetings while at the session on the 16th he asked for further clarification of the PRG's seven-point initiative. Commentator dismisses this as "more of the tortuous maneuvers" to which the Nixon Administration has resorted in attempting to cope with public opinion.

The unchanged U.S. policy, Commentator says, was made clear when "Nixon himself said on 17 September" that "the United States would continue to keep its eye on the main objective, which is 'a South Vietnam able to defend itself against a communist takeover' and the 'release of our POW's.'" The article adds that what the President implied is that he is bent on pursuing his Vietnamization policy, which precludes any real effort to negotiate a Vietnam settlement. (The allusion is clearly to the President's statement in his press conference on the 16th, not the 17th, when he in fact said "the main objective is to end the American involvement just as soon as that is consistent with our over-all goal, which is a South Vietnam able to defend itself against a communist takeover and which includes, from our standpoint, our primary interest in obtaining the release of our POW's.")

While Commentator does not explicitly refer to the President's press conference,* it was mentioned on the 18th--in a Liberation Radio broadcast and a Hanoi radio item in Mandarin--and in a 19 September NHAN DAN commentary pegged to the "struggle" in South Vietnam. Only the latter mentioned the President's remarks on prisoners, stating that the President "revealed his intention" to continue the war while carrying on

* Hanoi and PRG media, atypically, completely ignored the President's 4 August press conference in which he spoke about his planned trip to China as well as about Vietnam. The last Presidential interview which prompted a NHAN DAN Commentator article was that on 16 April 1971 before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Hanoi commented on a lower level on his press conferences of 29 April, 1 May, and 1 June.

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the pretense about his "primary interest in obtaining the release of our POW's." All three items, however, said that the President defended the 3 October presidential election in South Vietnam even though Thieu is the only candidate.

The NHAN DAN Commentator article--which spells out the provisions of points one and two--is the first Vietnamese communist comment on the Paris talks or negotiations since July when the PRG's seven-point proposal was being pressed. (There was, most recently, a NHAN DAN Commentator article on 25 July and a Liberation Radio commentary on the 31st.) It is unclear what prompted the comment at this level at this time, but it seems most likely that it was a combination of circumstances--Ambassador Porter's assumption of his post, the President's press conference, and perhaps the recent flurry of speculation in the U.S. press, particularly pegged to Senator McGovern's remarks on his talks in Paris, that the communists are flexible about their proposals and willing to separate points one and two. The VNA account of the Paris session on the 16th, predictably, gave no hint of Ambassador Porter's attempts to get the communist delegates to confirm or deny reports that there had been changes or clarifications of their negotiating position. In its standard, cryptic fashion, VNA dealt with the U.S. representative by saying that he "again resorted to the old trick of asking questions so as to avoid answering" the PRG proposal.

VNA mentioned the give-and-take following the presentation of the formal statements only when it reported that Thuy in "additional remarks" said the U.S. representative's "allegations" at the session prove that the Nixon Administration refuses to withdraw U.S. troops in 1971 and "to get rid of the bellicose Nguyen Van Thieu clique, thus impeding the progress" of the Paris talks. Thus, there is no acknowledgment of his question whether the United States is willing to announce a troop withdrawal and an end to the "maintenance" of the Thieu regime "at the same time." In line with standard practice, Hanoi media did not report the post-session briefings*; hence there is no acknowledgment that reporters pressed the communist spokesmen on the issue of whether troop withdrawal and the release of prisoners can be settled separately or whether they are interdependent.

* The DRV's long-standing practice has been to transmit its "memoranda" on the communist press briefings back to Hanoi on VNA's information and service channel, but not to report the briefings in any of its propaganda media.

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DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS HEAVY U.S. AIR STRIKES AT NORTH

The heavy, sustained U.S. air strikes against the DRV on 21 September prompted a DRV Foreign Ministry statement rather than another of the usual, continuing protests against air strikes by the spokesman for the foreign ministry. The most recent previous protest at the more authoritative foreign ministry level was issued on 22 March 1971 in connection with the concentrated strikes of 21-22 March. Before that there were DRV Foreign Ministry protests over heavy air strikes on 21 November and 1-2 May in 1970.* The current statement, like the three previous ones, says that the air strikes violate the U.S. bombing halt and threaten the work of the Paris conference. But at this writing Vietnamese communist media have not carried the announcement--reported by Western news agencies--that the DRV and PRG delegates will not attend the 23 September session of the Paris talks and asked for a resumption of the talks on the 30th.**

The current statement charges that the United States "mobilized more than 200 aircraft" to conduct "repeated strikes against many populated areas in Quang Ninh and Le Thuy districts, Quang Binh Province." It also charges that the strikes "killed or injured a number of civilians, including many old people, women, and children and destroyed many homes." The statement claims that the U.S. acts were "appropriately punished" and that the Quang Binh armed forces and people downed two planes "and damaged many others." A Hanoi radio broadcast early on the 22d had reported the downings, saying they brought the total of downed U.S. planes to 3,999. (The U.S. Command, in reporting the sustained strikes, said that no U.S. planes were hit and that all returned safely to their bases in South Vietnam and Thailand.)

* While a 3 March 1971 foreign ministry statement came on the heels of U.S. announcements of concentrated strikes against the North, it did not acknowledge them but focused instead on alleged U.S. plans for "new military adventures" against the DRV.

** The communist delegates asked for a postponement of the weekly Paris session in each of the three previous instances. After the postponement of the 25 March session at the communists' request, the allied delegates asked for a postponement of the 1 April session. Although in March the Foreign Ministry statement was issued three days before the next scheduled Paris session, VNA did not report the delegations' statements that they would not attend the session until 0519 GMT on the 25th.

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Unlike the previous three foreign ministry statements, the current one appeals to the socialist countries, peace- and justice-loving countries, and U.S. public opinion "to resolutely struggle to check the Americans' criminal hands and to intensify their support of the Vietnamese people's just cause until total victory." But it echoes the 21 November 1970 statement when it says the strikes "constitute an insolent challenge to peace- and justice-loving public opinion in the world and the United States." (The 3 March 1971 statement--at a time when Hanoi seemed to be displaying particular concern--claimed in addition that U.S. acts against the DRV constituted "an impudent challenge to the socialist countries" and others.)

In more severe language than that of the three previous statements, the current one says the DRV Government sternly condemns "these extremely grave and criminal acts of war" and places full responsibility on the United States. The 22 March and 21 November statements on air strikes merely condemned the "acts of war," while the 1 May statement called them "criminal". The expression of resolve to persevere in struggle against the United States is common, of course, to all the statements.

RADIO COMMENT In the same domestic service program on the 22d that carried the foreign ministry statement, Hanoi radio broadcast a commentary scoring the U.S. strikes and hailing the alleged feat of the Quang Binh "armed forces and people" in downing the planes. Stating that the new "barbarous war acts" have further exposed the Nixon Administration's "stubborn and bellicose nature," the commentary adds: "Ballyhooing about its so-called good will for peace and about its will to negotiate, Nixon's bellicose hands" have continued to press the war and Vietnamization. It asserts that the President's "pledge of support" has enabled Thieu to carry out "a bloody campaign of terror" in South Vietnam and that it was on President Nixon's orders that the planes carried out their strikes against the North. It cites AP in stating that the bombings were authorized by President Nixon or Defense Secretary Laird.

Taking a familiar tack, the commentary says that the strikes do not demonstrate U.S. strength but only "recklessness and rashness" at a time when the United States is being "stunned by repeated blows". Recalling that President Johnson could not subdue the North

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Vietnamese people after four years of bombing, it asks how President Nixon "can hope to use bombs and shells to shake our heroic Vietnamese people's iron-firm determination to achieve independence and freedom." It warns "Nixon and company that the more stubborn and insolent" they are, the more defeats they will suffer. It reminds them of the inviolability of DRV territory, and it expresses Vietnamese resolve to punish "all U.S. adventurous acts."

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MME. BINH STOPS IN MOSCOW, PEKING ON WAY HOME FROM PARIS

MOSCOW PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's 11-14 September stopover in Moscow on her way home to Hanoi from the Paris talks received minimal publicity. Her arrival in Moscow, after a 6-11 September visit to Poland, was briefly reported by TASS that day, and PRAVDA on the 12th noted that she was met at the airport by Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin. A short PRAVDA report on the 14th noted that Gromyko hosted her at a luncheon the day before. According to PRAVDA on the 16th, Firubin saw her off on the 14th.

During her last stop in Moscow en route home from Paris, from 11 to 13 June 1970, brief PRAVDA and TASS reports indicated that she was again met at the airport by Firubin, but there were no reports that she had talks with any Soviet officials.*

PEKING NCNA on 16 September reported at some length on the warm welcome accorded Mme. Binh on her arrival at Peking's airport that day "on her way home from Paris." It said she deplaned "amid cheers and the beating of drums and gongs" to be greeted by a flag- and banner-waving crowd and the dancing of "merry children" at the airport "permeated with a very warm atmosphere of the great friendship and militant unity of the people of China and Vietnam." She was accompanied by PRG Ambassador to Poland Tran Van Tu and was met, according to NCNA, by leading government and party officials--led by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei--and by leading members of various organizations. The report did not mention the Paris talks.

Mme. Binh was feted at a welcoming banquet hosted by Chi Peng-fei on the evening of the 16th. On the 17th she was "called on" by Chou En-lai in the afternoon and had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with Chou, Chiang Ching, and Chi Peng-fei that evening, according to an NCNA report of the 17th. On the 18th NCNA said that Mme. Binh met with

* Her return to Paris in August 1970 followed visits to India, Ceylon, Tanzania, and Zambia, and there were thus no stops in Peking and Moscow.

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Sihanouk that day. Chou and Chi Peng-fei gave a banquet on the 19th in her honor, NCNA said. No speeches or toasts were reported for either the banquet on the 16th or that on the 19th. NCNA announced her departure "for Vietnam" on the 22d; she was seen off by the same group which had met her on arrival with the exception of Fang I, who was not present for her departure.

In contrast, Mme. Binh's 13 June 1970 arrival in Peking "on her way home from Paris" was not reported until the 17th, when a single brief Peking domestic service item noted that Chou En-lai had had a "warm and friendly talk" with her that day and had given an "informal banquet" in her honor. As this time, no speeches or toasts were reported. Peking media gave no other publicity to that visit.

MOSCOW STRESSES AID TO DRV, ASSAILS SINO-U.S. "MANEUVERS"

Moscow continues to publicize its aid to Vietnam in routine-level comment. A 17 September IZVESTIYA article by Ilinskiy, for example, echoed some recent comment in reviewing Soviet economic and military aid given over the years in some detail as regards type and volume.* An article on Soviet aid transported by sea, in the Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY on the 15th, said among other things that in the first half of 1971 "enough cargo to fill 380 trains was brought to the DRV by sea." On the 17th the Moscow domestic service reported that Soviet ships were unloading cargoes in Haiphong "for the DRV national economy" that are "particularly necessary" at present when the Vietnamese are overcoming the effects of the floods.

Moscow currently plays up Vietnamese gratitude for Soviet relief aid sent in connection with the floods. On 13 September TASS reported the arrival in Hanoi that day of three Soviet cargo planes with medicines, food, and clothing sent by the Soviet

* A 2 September PRAVDA article and Vice Premier Novikov's speech at a 31 August Moscow meeting on DRV National Day, for instance, referred to industrial projects the USSR built in the DRV, the training of specialists, and military aid such as planes and rockets.

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Red Cross Society. TASS on the 17th and PRAVDA the next day reported a message from Le Duan to Brezhnev thanking him for a sympathy message of 2 September and for the relief aid sent by the USSR. The only known official Soviet message on the floods to have previously been reported by Moscow was dated 30 August and belatedly reported briefly by TASS on 2 September and in full by PRAVDA on the 3d. The message was sent by "the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the USSR Council of Ministers" and did not mention Brezhnev by name. To date, Hanoi media are not known to have publicized the Le Duan message.*

In its continuing campaign to discredit Chinese motives in inviting President Nixon to visit Peking, routine-level Moscow comment repeats the charge that Peking hopes to reach an agreement on the Indochina question "behind the backs" of the people of the region. The 4 September PRAVDA article by I. Aleksandrov broadly attacking Peking's divisive policies, which includes the charge that a "deal" at the expense of the Indochinese people is being planned, has continued to be rebroadcast by Moscow radio in installments as recently as 20 September.** Much of Moscow's current comment consists of replays of articles in the organs of foreign communist parties which charge that the United States also hopes to make a deal and claim that the invitation has enabled the President to avoid responding to the PRG's peace initiative.

Moscow's minimal attention to President Nixon's 16 September press conference includes a domestic service commentary which focuses on his remarks on the Thieu government. It says that the President defended the regime's conduct of the election "farce" and stated that the United States will continue supporting that regime so that it can "withstand the communist threat"; it does not mention the President's comment on the release of U.S. prisoners. The commentary contrasts President Nixon's remarks with those made in Saigon by Senator McGovern, who spoke of the failure of Vietnamization and of the corruption in Saigon and called for a U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam.

* Peking has not mentioned relief aid to the DRV since the PRC leaders' sympathy messages on 25 and 29 August and 2 September promised "relief" measures and "all-out support and assistance" to the Vietnamese people in overcoming the floods. However, VNA on 19 September announced the arrival of both Chinese and Soviet relief shipments.

** See the 9 September TRENDS, pages 11 and 15-17, for a discussion of this article.

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Some Moscow comment continues routinely to accuse the United States of procrastinating at the Paris talks and of refusing to respond to the PRG's seven-point plan while at the same time continuing to expand the aggression. Reporting statements by members of Congress, including Senators McGovern and Bayh, denouncing U.S. "aggression" and support for the Thieu government and calling for a deadline, TASS sees such statements as proof of the growth of protests in the United States against the continuation of the war.

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DRV PROPAGANDA ON JAPANESE CP VISIT AVOIDS POLEMICAL ISSUES

Hanoi propaganda on the 10-18 September visit to the DRV of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) delegation led by Chairman Kenji Miyamoto* points up the sharp curtailment of the anti-Chinese polemics which marked North Vietnamese propaganda for six weeks following the 15 July announcement of President Nixon's planned visit to Peking. Not only have Hanoi statements during the visit failed to raise the questions of socialist unity or the independence of individual parties, but Hanoi media have ignored even mildly polemical statements by Miyamoto on these and other issues.

On 14 September Hanoi carried brief accounts of an 11 September reception for the JCP delegation at which Vietnamese party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan and Chairman Miyamoto spoke. Hanoi's cursory reports ignored remarks by Miyamoto--published in full in the JCP organ AKAHATA on the 15th--which were in line with Hanoi's previous public polemic following the announcement of President Nixon's plans to visit Peking.

Among other things, Miyamoto warned that the United States "has pursued a policy of 'divide and strike' against the socialist camp and national liberation forces" and underlined the importance of "the international solidarity of the broad anti-imperialist forces in their struggle to support the Indochinese people." In addition, he urged unity among communist and anti-imperialist forces in the face of "insidious tricks" by the United States on the Indochina question, asserted that the JCP never had "any illusions about the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism," and denounced the views of "certain people in Japan who have suddenly begun to idealize Nixon as an 'apostle of peace' in commenting on the way he has been handling matters recently." (This transparent reference to President Nixon's projected China visit echoes earlier JCP comment--for example, in an article in the 21 August AKAHATA--which scored opposition parties in Japan for claiming that the decision to make the trip represents a favorable change in U.S. policy and charged that, on the contrary, the visit was aimed at diverting public attention from U.S. "aggression" in Indochina.)

* When the Miyamoto delegation left Japan on 19 August, AKAHATA announced that it would visit Romania, Italy, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. The delegation is now on the last leg of its tour, paying an official visit in Moscow.

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Monitored Hanoi media have not even mentioned a 17 September Pham Van Dong meeting with the JCP delegation which AKAHATA reported on the 19th. Miyamoto remarked on this occasion, according to the JCP paper, that the North Vietnamese party and government, "in a complex situation," are "pushing their independent activities while strengthening unity with the anti-imperialist forces in the world." Hanoi radio did broadcast the text of a nonpolemical speech delivered by Miyamoto at a 16 September Hanoi meeting, in which the JCP leader made no reference to the socialist camp but did state that the Vietnamese "struggle is a positive contribution to the unification of all anti-imperialist forces."

The communique issued at the close of the JCP visit refers to the solidarity of the two parties but mentions neither the importance of communist unity nor alleged U.S. efforts to split the socialist countries. The communique does label the United States the "arch enemy" of the world and holds that the Indochinese problem "has always remained the focal point of the duel on a world scale between imperialism and anti-imperialist forces."

In contrast to the JCP-VWP document, earlier joint communiqués issued by the Miyamoto delegation with the Romanian, Italian, and Spanish communist parties uniformly called for efforts to unify communist and anti-imperialist forces and for respect for each party's autonomy and independence.* The communique with the Romanians particularly emphasized the issue of communist unity; it declared that the two parties "consider that one of the present tasks of greatest importance is to firmly campaign for the unity of all the democratic, progressive, and anti-imperialist forces, with the participation of the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian peoples."

* The JCP communique with the Romanian party was released on 3 September at the close of the Miyamoto delegation's visit to Romania, which began on 20 August. AKAHATA on 6 September published a communique signed jointly with a delegation of the Spanish CP following talks between those two parties in late August; the Spanish CP delegation with which the Japanese conferred was in Romania from 6 August to 4 September. The JCP communique with the Italian party was released following Miyamoto's 3-8 September visit to Italy.

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DRV CAUTION Hanoi's failure even to join with the JCP
TOWARD PEKING in an appeal for communist unity may reflect
 the delicate position of the DRV in playing
host to representatives of a party openly hostile to the
Chinese leaders. But Hanoi's new caution with respect to
Peking was already apparent in its propaganda prior to the JCP
delegation's visit and seems to reflect a decision by the DRV
leaders to call a halt to public censure of Peking's moves
vis-a-vis the United States.

Hanoi media have not pressed warnings about U.S. maneuvers to
split the socialist camp or assertions of DRV independence
since the end of August. The last major polemical attack was
the 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article blasted the
Chinese as "opportunist." An editorial on the 19 August
anniversary of the August Revolution, published in the QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN monthly magazine and broadcast by Hanoi on
29 August, did reiterate Hanoi's argument that the Vietnamese
must decide their own fate. But Pham Van Dong's 31 August
national day address did not raise the issue of DRV
independence or include the standard reference to the need
to consolidate the socialist camp.* Similarly, Hanoi
propaganda marking the 3 September second anniversary of Ho
Chi Minh's death did not recall the appeal in Ho's testament
for the restoration of unity among communist parties.

Hanoi media's treatment of the 22 August Commentator article
and of an earlier QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on 3 August by
"Chien Thang" (The Victor)** attacking the Chinese had
suggested that there might have been some disagreement in
August over publicity for further criticism of Peking.
While Hanoi's first attacks in July on Peking's invitation
to the President were promptly publicized in Hanoi's domestic
radio service, the Chien Thang article was not broadcast and
was only belatedly summarized by VNA eight days after its

* Pham Van Dong's 1970 national day speech noted that the
DRV had endeavored to restore the solidarity of the socialist
camp and thus was consistent with other DRV statements in
the wake of the testament, released after Ho's death in
September 1969, which appealed for the party to attempt to
unify the socialist camp.

** The Chien Thang article is discussed in the TRENDS of
18 August, pages 1-4.

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publication. The 22 August Commentator article, the most bitter of the attacks on Peking, was similarly not broadcast in the domestic service, although excerpts were carried by VNA and in Hanoi radio's Mandarin-language service. (A translation of the text of the Commentator article as published in NHAN DAN is still not available.)

MIYAMOTO'S 1966 TOUR Miyamoto last headed a JCP delegation to the DRV in February 1966, in the course of a tour that included official visits to China and North Korea. Undertaken just prior to the 23d CPSU Congress, the tour appeared to be aimed at seeking some basis for unifying the world communist movement in support of Vietnam.* The joint JCP-VWP communique in 1966 said both sides held that "at present the formation and expansion of a united front of the world's people against U.S. imperialism, for peace and national independence is an extremely important and urgent task." No joint communique was released at the close of Miyamoto's visit to China, but in January 1967--following the deterioration of relations between Peking and the Japanese party--AKAHATA revealed that a communique had been drafted and approved by a CCP delegation headed by Chou En-lai but that Mao would not consent to its publication because the JCP refused to include a call for a united front against both the United States and the Soviet Union.

An article published in the 9 September 1971 issue of AKAHATA, just prior to the arrival of the current Miyamoto mission in Hanoi, referred to the 1966 dispute with Peking and claimed that the CCP's theory of an "anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet united front" had met with "complete failure." The article--full text of which is not yet available--noted that joint communiques signed by the CCP with other parties since last year had not criticized the Soviet Union. The article goes on, however, to charge that "the great-power chauvinists of the CCP have not abandoned, once and for all, the 'anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet' policy." It explains that Peking has refrained from directly pressing this policy to avoid being "isolated in the international arena," but that the Chinese continue to indicate their position by the use of "substitute terms" such as references to opposing "superpowers."

* See the 31 March 1966 FBIS SURVEY, pages 39-41, for a discussion of the JCP delegation's tour and relations among the Asian communist parties. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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HANOI REPORTS FIGHTING IN U MINH JUNGLE, NOTES LAM SON 810

Vietnamese communist media reflect the stepped-up fighting in the U Minh jungle of South Vietnam, with reports that the PLAF on 14-16 September launched heavy attacks on allied positions there. An article in the 19 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claims that the PLAF has foiled the allied pacification operation in the U Minh area; it recalls that a large-scale allied operation was begun in the area last December and that new forces were sent there in May. From December through August, according to the paper, "liberation forces" in the area have put out of action more than 11,000 allied troops. The article comments that the allies "could not drive out the liberation forces" but that, "on the contrary, the U Minh resistance base has become stronger and the people's war has further developed."

The recently concluded ARVN operation in northern Quang Tri--Lam Son 810--has been mentioned in passing in Hanoi comment praising PLAF action in the area in past weeks.* An article in the 16 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, for example, recalled communist attacks on ARVN positions last August and said that "to save the puppet troops from danger, the U.S. command ordered massive fire-support and sent many American battalions back to Highway 9 to support the puppets in their highly touted 'Operation Lam Son 810.'" The article claimed that recent battles demonstrated that the defense line along Highway 9 has been "attacked and broken through."

* Hanoi's first references to Lam Son 810 were in comment on the alleged downing of a U.S. plane over the DRV on 7 September. See the 15 September TRENDS, pages 3-5.

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EAST GERMANY - USSR - PRC

GDR PARTY WARNS AGAINST CHINESE ANTI-SOVIET DIVISIVE TACTICS

Soviet bloc concern over Peking's contacts with the United States and efforts to penetrate the Balkans is registered for the first time at the party leadership level in a Politburo report delivered by Hermann Axen to the SED Central Committee on 16 September. As summarized by the East German news agency, the report indicates that China's new flexible tactics were a focal point of discussion at the 2 August Crimea meeting of Soviet bloc leaders and that the upshot was a plan for coordinated efforts to "first and foremost strengthen the alliance of the socialist community" (counter Chinese diplomatic activity and try to bring the Romanians into line) and to press Moscow's diplomatic offensive with both "the socialist countries" (Hanoi and Belgrade) and the capitalist states.

In line with earlier Soviet bloc press comment on the PRC's invitation to President Nixon, the SED report pays lip service to the desirability of improved Chinese-American relations in accordance with international norms, then drives home the point that "at the same time, it cannot be overlooked that Peking's 'flirtation' with Washington is undoubtedly inspired by anti-Sovietism and antisocialist aims and is therefore directed against the anti-imperialist liberation movement and peoples." In passages clearly addressed chiefly to the Romanians and in a lesser degree to the Albanians and Yugoslavs, the report says that "efforts of the Mao group to come to terms with the imperialists are accompanied by a striking intensification of the Chinese leadership's activities in the Balkans." It adds that the Chinese leaders are exploiting "certain nationalist tendencies deviating from proletarian class positions"--trends "which manifest themselves, for example, in the approval expressed by Maoist slogans for the so-called cultural revolution and the 'struggle against the superpowers.'" Further, it says, they "seek to undermine the unity of the community of socialist states."

Maintaining that this Chinese "venture has no realistic prospect" of success, Axen's report states that these developments in the Balkans "must be watched for the present." In this context, as if to underscore the right of the Soviet bloc to monitor "socialism" in the area and take action if necessary

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to defend it, the report adds that "the course of historical development is determined neither by Mao Tse-tung nor by Richard Nixon, but first and foremost by the growing might and unity and community of socialist states, with the USSR as its principal force."

TASS TREATMENT OF ADN REPORT

TASS picked up the ADN account of the SED report on the 17th, including the comments on U.S.-Chinese relations but deleting the warning on the Balkans. This followed the pattern of Moscow's treatment of earlier veiled threats to the Romanians emanating from the East European press organs in the wake of the Crimea summit. Moscow did not publicize the 13 August Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP article raising the spectre of an anti-Soviet, pro-Peking Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest axis in the Balkans. And a PRAVDA account of a 14 August NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article deleted the East German paper's warning--clearly directed at the Romanians--that "anyone who pursues a policy of tolerance and concession toward the Mao group's great power chauvinism...violates the fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism." But the PRAVDA summary of the article included NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's demand that communists "decisively repudiate the unprincipled divisive policy of the Chinese leaders" and its call for "a struggle against all aspects of opportunism, against anti-Sovietism and nationalism"--the latter a codeword for the Romanian deviation.

Thus Moscow's propaganda tactics at this juncture appear to emphasize continued use of the proxy of its East European allies to apply periodic pressure on the Romanians, while concentrating in its own media on discrediting the Chinese as warmongers and projecting a positive image of the USSR as a champion of peace and detente as a backdrop to the Soviet leadership's wooing of Tito and its other fall diplomatic activities.

CEAUSESCU DENIES ROMANIA HAS SINNED AGAINST INTERNATIONALISM

In apparent response to the East German party's charges that some Balkan countries have violated the principles of proletarian internationalism, Romanian party chief Ceausescu used the occasion of a party aktiv meeting on the evening of the 16th, several hours after ADN carried the SED report, to make an unusually detailed and assertive defense of Romania's loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism--as

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interpreted in Bucharest. Forcefully rejecting the idea that his country has placed its national interests above its internationalist obligations, Ceausescu stated that "just as we have never neglected our national duties, neither have we neglected our international duties." Declaring that when one speaks of internationalism one must "refer not to slogans but to deeds," he went on to list Romania's contributions to the communist movement from the days of the Paris commune to its solidarity today with the North Vietnamese.

Ceausescu defined Romania's view of proletarian internationalism in stating: "Our party's internationalism is reflected in the continuous development of relations with all the communist and workers' parties . . . , in the fight for strengthening communist unity and cooperation on the basis of respect for the right of each party to self-dependently work out its own political line." And he argued by implication against the Soviet bloc view of Balkan security under Moscow's hegemony in adding pointedly that the Romanian definition of proletarian internationalism includes struggling for the establishment of "a climate of trust and close cooperation among the Balkan countries that should make of this zone a region of peace in Europe and permit each Balkan country to devote its energies to the respective people's progress and welfare." He emphasized again that the Romanian concepts of both internationalism and European security are based on respect "for sovereignty and independence, mutual advantage, and refraining in interstate relations from the threat or use of force."

In effect summarizing the message for his communist neighbors that Romania will not be intimidated by propaganda pressures, Ceausescu concluded that it is in the spirit of these principles that Romania has acted in the past and "will continue to act in the future, too, as we consider that in this way we are implementing our duty both toward our people and to the cause of socialism and peace."

Further testimony to Bucharest's intention to pursue contacts with the Chinese was provided by an 18 September NCNA report on the arrival in Peking of a group of "vacationing" Romanian army officers led by General Ion Tutoveanu, Director of the Military Academy of the Romanian Armed Forces. NCNA said the group was met by Peng Shao-hui, deputy chief of the PLA General Staff.

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ZAGREB PRESS, RADIO ASSAIL GDR MEDDLING IN BALKAN AFFAIRS

Against the background of efforts by Belgrade's semiofficial BORBA and POLITIKA to prepare propaganda groundwork for Brezhnev's arrival by dwelling on the "traditional friendship" of the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples, the more free-wheeling Zagreb press and radio have responded critically to the SED's expression of concern over the situation in the Balkans. Zagreb's VJESNIK, which recently published a lengthy interview with Chou En-lai, commented in an article on the 18th that the SED report is "impermissible interference in the affairs of others." It added that "the pharisee-like East German concern over an imagined Chinese penetration into the Balkans is in fact unworthy of polemics." The article nevertheless went on to wonder why "it has been precisely the SED which has taken over the relay race baton from the Hungarian newspaper [MAGYAR HIRLAP]...which started as a warning and now already is turning into a campaign." Noting the timing of the release of the SED report, the Zagreb paper asked further whether it might be "a possible accompanying tune or even possible advice, or even pressure, on the eve of Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia."

Also on the 18th, Radio Zagreb commentator Milika Sundic assailed the SED report as "gratuitous and lacking in good intentions." He added that the Soviet camp does not like to see Chinese relations with the Balkan countries normalized because "it wants to proclaim the Balkan area its own sphere of interest in its unspoken desire to meddle in the internal affairs of the countries in this area as it sees fit." Declaring that "no one can have special privileges and rights in this area," Sundic concluded that "as far as Yugoslavia is concerned, it will resist any attempt at direct or indirect interference in its internal affairs, no matter where the interference comes from."

SOVIET MEDIA CONTINUE PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT PEKING

Almost three weeks after the appearance on 4 September of the latest article under the authoritative signature of I. Aleksandrov in PRAVDA, which portrayed the Chinese as outlaws in the international movement and called for intensified efforts to "expose" the Maoists, Radio Moscow is still broadcasting installments of the article to audiences worldwide while developing its basic themes in routine-level radio and press comment. Texts or lengthy summaries of the Aleksandrov article appeared promptly

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in the leading party dailies of most of Moscow's orthodox East European allies.* Pro-Soviet communist parties, taking their cue from PRAVDA, have published a spate of articles elaborating on Aleksandrov's catalogue of charges against the Chinese, and Soviet media in turn have reproduced or summarized these articles to picture a groundswell of anti-Chinese sentiment among communists throughout the world.

On 18 September, for example, PRAVDA reprinted an article from EL POPULAR, the organ of the Uruguyan Communist Party, playing the themes that Peking's invitation to President Nixon is basically anti-Soviet in its motivation, is against the best interests of the world communist movement, and is particularly adverse to the interests of North Vietnam. PRAVDA used the proxy of the Uruguyan party to impugn President Nixon's motives for the trip, which Moscow has stopped short of doing in its own name. Thus the EL POPULAR article, as reprinted in PRAVDA, commented that although the President is trying to make some people believe U.S. foreign policy has changed, "even the most reactionary U.S. press regards Nixon's upcoming trip to Peking as a foreign policy act dictated by mercenary motives and by anticommunist interests..., and reactionary circles throughout the world link these contacts with plans to undermine the unity of the anti-imperialist forces."

Similarly, the 10-16 September issue of ZA RUBEZHOM published a four-page roundup of foreign press articles on the PRC's splittist policies. The largest amount of space was devoted to a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article, "From Leftwing Adventures to Complicity with the Imperialists," which developed the theme that Peking's "hegemonistic aspirations are causing serious harm to the national liberation movement." ZA RUBEZHOM's roundup also included an article from the Bulgarian army organ NARODNA ARMIYA attacking Peking's diplomatic activity in Asia and Africa, which the paper maintained is in reality aiding the imperialists and "preventing the developing states from acquiring true political and economic independence." And an article taken from the Colombian Communist Party organ VOZ PROLETARIA suggested that the Chinese would be willing to sell out the North Vietnamese to achieve "an alliance" with the United States.

* See the TRENDS of 9 September for a discussion of the Aleksandrov article and the immediate followup in the Soviet and East European press.

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PEKING ON JAPAN

"MANCHURIAN INCIDENT" RECALLED IN ATTACK ON JAPAN MILITARISM

Chinese propagandists have seized on the 40th anniversary of the 18 September "Manchurian Incident" as an occasion to inveigh against the alleged revival of militarism in Japan. Highlighting Chinese attention to the anniversary is a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, released by NCNA on 18 September, which picks up the theme--common in comment on Japan since the Nixon-Sato talks in 1969--that Japanese reactionaries are successfully turning Japan into a powerful military force commensurate with its economic influence in Asia. NCNA has given wide domestic and international dissemination to the editorial as well as other commentaries on the anniversary.

Peking's attention to this anniversary has been slight in recent years. On the last decennial anniversary in 1961, however, there was also a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and related propaganda.

While the editorial fully exploits the theme of a revival of militarism in Japan, some soft-pedaling of the terms for improving China-Japan relations could be read into the editorial's omission of any specific demand that the Japanese abrogate the 1952 Japan-Nationalist China treaty. That requirement was spelled out in last July's joint communique between the China-Japan Friendship Association and a delegation of the Komeito Party, Japan's second largest opposition party. In Peking's last authoritative editorial on Japan--a joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial released on 3 September 1970 to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Japan's wartime defeat in China--"military collusion between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek" was firmly denounced; no such reference appears in the editorial just released. However, Japan's "attempt to lay hands on China's sacred territory Taiwan province" by arguing that the "status of Taiwan remains to be determined" is firmly condemned. The "mass movement for Japan-China friendship" is portrayed as a "mighty current" which "Eisaku Sato and his ilk" will not be able to hold back.

Seeking to sharpen the desired image of Japan's growing military threat to peace in Asia, the editorial focuses on a detailed account of the "18 September incident"--the beginning of Japan's

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"blood-smeared history of aggression and war" in China. Portraying Japan today as an economic power whose "economic strength is seven or eight times that of prewar days," the editorial argued that "economic expansion definitely leads to military expansion."

Peking's fear that the Nixon Doctrine will ultimately place Japan in the role of protecting U.S. interests in Asia was reflected in the editorial's assertion that "U.S. imperialism is eager to use Japanese militarism as its stormtrooper in launching aggression in Asia." The editorial also sniped at "social-imperialism" for seeking to "enlist Japanese militarism in opposing China and undermining the revolutionary movement in Asia." Turning its attention to pro-Peking forces within Japan, the editorial drew a distinction between the Japanese people and "Japanese militarism" and called upon "farsighted people in Japanese economic and political circles" to counter the influence of a "handful of pro-U.S. monopoly capitalists" and work for dismantling U.S. military bases within Japan as well as abrogation of the U.S.-Japan military alliance.

In an apparent effort to add historical depth to local discussions on "Japanese militarism," NCNA on 17 September publicized reference material for use in studying the 1931 incident. The material includes information on the rarely mentioned "Tanaka memorial" of 1927--which revealed Japanese plans to use Manchuria as a foothold for expansion in China--and details the historic events leading to the Marco Polo Bridge incident of 1937 when Japan launched an all-out war against China and "barbarously pursued a policy to kill all, burn all, and plunder all."

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

MOSCOW HAILS BRANDT VISIT, PLAYS DOWN INTER-GERMAN DIFFERENCES

Voluminous Soviet propaganda, replete with praise for West German Chancellor Brandt personally, characterizes Brandt's 16-18 September talks with Brezhnev in the Crimean resort of Oreanda as a "substantial" contribution to the strengthening of European peace and security. Underscoring the point that the meetings are in keeping with the "peace program" outlined at the 24th CPSU Congress, Moscow says the results are evoking feelings of "deep satisfaction" among all who cherish peace and detente.

Reflecting the main points of the joint communique issued on the 18th, followup Soviet comment, keyed by a PRAVDA editorial on the 20th, stresses that the two sides noted the importance of FRG ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties for the development of West German-Soviet relations; that they would consult with each other and with their respective allies to accelerate the convening of a European security conference; that they found "common" positions on the question of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe "without detriment to the participating states," and that they would promote the normalization of relations between the GDR and the FRG, including both states' participation in the United Nations.

While giving prominent and generally thorough coverage to all aspects of the Brandt visit, including the Chancellor's comments before his departure from Bonn and his post-visit remarks on his talks with Brezhnev,* the Moscow central press has watered down the strong protestations issuing from East German leaders at the 16-17 September SED Central Committee plenary session, which coincided with the Brandt visit, over the difficulties being encountered in the current GDR-FRG and GDR-West Berlin Senat talks.

* Moscow media have yet to acknowledge that Brezhnev has accepted an invitation from Brandt to visit the Federal Republic at a date "convenient" to the Soviet leader.

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GDR positions on the Berlin agreement and the inter-German talks were underscored in speeches by SED leader Honecker, Politburo member Axen--who gave the Politburo report on SED activities since the eighth SED congress in June--and Politburo member Sindermann, as well as in a Central Committee resolution formally stating SED endorsement of the quadripartite agreement "on West Berlin." The Central Committee resolution declares that the GDR wants "rapidly to reach positive results in the negotiations with the FRG Government and the West Berlin Senat," adding the GDR's "expectation" that Bonn and the Senat "will also display the required realism and good will so that the corresponding agreements can be concluded in the interests of all parties concerned and European detente." Axen said in his report that the Politburo had given "the appropriate directives to make possible the conclusion, in negotiations with the FRG Government, of a general traffic treaty [vertrag] and an agreement [abkommen] on civilian transit traffic of persons from the FRG and goods from the FRG to and from West Berlin. The negotiations with the West Berlin Senat are aimed at obtaining an agreement on questions of normalizing the relations as well as alleviating and improving traffic from and to West Berlin." Axen went on to assert that it is the GDR's aim to reach "positive results" in the two series of negotiations. The TASS summary of Axen's report omitted the details of the East German proposals to Bonn and the Senat, noting only the call for "positive results."

In contrast to Axen, both Honecker and Sindermann charged the West Germans with hindering the progress of the negotiations. In a long discussion of GDR-FRG relations and the importance of the quadripartite agreement for GDR sovereignty, Honecker sought to place the blame for lack of progress in the inter-German talks on the Federal Government, alluding to the difficulties over an agreed German translation of the Berlin accord: "Anyone seeking to impede such a development [based on contractual agreements between the GDR and FRG and the GDR and West Berlin Senat] by threat of blackmail against the GDR will have to bear the responsibility for the ensuing consequences." He added that the proposed GDR treaties and agreements are based on "realism" and are "on the table and could be signed tomorrow." However, in a more conciliatory manner, Honecker said that "despite the difficulties which have arisen in the negotiations" the GDR maintains that "today, as before, it is still possible to bring the negotiations to a rapid successful conclusion, given good will on all sides."

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Soviet reports on Honecker's speech included his comments on "difficulties"--the first acknowledgment of difficulties in the current German phase of the Berlin negotiations to appear in the Soviet central press, although direct and indirect references to differences between Bonn and East Berlin over the "inter-German" talks have appeared in routine Moscow radio propaganda. An initial TASS report citing ADN, and following ADN's account very closely, noted both Honecker's remarks on the "difficulties" and his "blackmail" charge. But dispatches in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 19th, without attribution to ADN, referred only to the difficulties and left out the charge against the West Germans.

COMMENT, REPORTAGE
IN EAST BERLIN MEDIA

East Berlin media carried a spate of comment on the eve of the Brandt visit to the Crimea denouncing Bonn for attempting to conduct "inter-German negotiations" under the umbrella of the four-power agreement. These commentaries followed by a day the third sessions of the talks in the German phase between the GDR and the FRG and the GDR and the West Berlin Senat, which were abruptly broken off after brief meetings on the 14th over the German translation problem. Seeking to evince support for the GDR stand on the translation, ADN and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND have carried reports citing "Western diplomats" as saying there is no "official" German translation of the agreement and quoting Abrasimov's statement to GDR newsmen after the 3 September signing to the effect that only the three official languages are "authentic" and that the Big Four had "nothing to do with the German translation of the agreement."

Noting the cancellation by Senat representative Mueller of his fourth post-signing meeting with GDR State Secretary Kohrt, which was to be held on the 22d, ADN said on the 20th that "evidently" the Senat is "not interested in a rapid and constructive consideration of the GDR proposals." Similarly, ADN said that GDR State Secretary Kohl "regretted" the attitude of FRG State Secretary Bahr expressed at their fourth meeting on the 22d--which lasted only 30 minutes; ADN noted that Bahr "was still not authorized to enter into substantive negotiations on the GDR drafts" presented on 6 September.

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Regarding Brandt's talks in the Crimea, East Berlin media carried a limited number of brief straightforward reports, and the text of the joint communique appeared in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 19th. East Berlin's first commentary on the visit, a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial on the 22d, reported by ADN, refers to the endorsement of the visit given in the communique on the visit of a Honecker-led GDR delegation to Warsaw 18-20 September, which said both the Polish and GDR leaders "welcomed with satisfaction the results" of the Brezhnev-Brandt talks. The editorial stresses that Brezhnev and Brandt "noted coinciding elements in their positions" on the establishment of normal relations, valid under international law, with the GDR.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW ANTICIPATES UNGA MIDEAST DEBATE, NOTES COUNCIL SESSION

While TASS on the 20th says it is believed in UN circles that a debate on the Middle East is one of the basic tasks of the session, Moscow touches on the issue only in general discussions of matters before the Assembly, with no suggestion that the Soviet Union is contemplating any initiative. One such broad report, by PRAVDA correspondents on the 21st, does take the occasion to reiterate Soviet support for a political settlement based on the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution, and again reaffirms Moscow's readiness to participate, along with other permanent members of the Security Council, in international guarantees for such a solution. (This Soviet position on guarantees was first stated at the elite level by Brezhnev in his 30 March CPSU Congress report.) Podgornyy, in a 14 September speech at a dinner honoring the visiting Afghan king, restated the standard Soviet call for Israeli implementation of Resolution 242, whose "main demand" is Israeli withdrawal from "all" occupied Arab lands. He added that the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE), with the support of the other Arab states, had made constructive proposals to this end.

TASS reports without comment Egyptian President as-Sadat's 16 September proposal for a Security Council meeting at the foreign minister level to provide clarification of attitudes on the Middle East problem. An account of the speech broadcast in Arabic noted that as-Sadat said Egypt would try at the UNGA session to obtain "decisive measures" for implementation of UN resolutions and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied areas. TASS on the 20th, noting that U Thant had stressed in his annual report that resumption of the Jarring mission was hardly advisable before Israel changed its stand on the troop withdrawal issue, observed that the General Assembly must therefore consider "effective measures to curb the aggressor."

COUNCIL DEBATE
ON JERUSALEM

TASS routinely reports the current Security Council debate on Jordan's complaint against Israel's "unlawful actions" in Jerusalem, accompanying the accounts with continuing attacks on Israeli occupation policies in the administered Arab territories, along with occasional comment pointing up economic and social problems in Israel itself. A Koryavin article in IZVESTIYA

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on the 19th points out that in the debate the Jordanian representative asked the Security Council to employ sanctions envisaged in the UN Charter to get Israel to respect UN decisions, and that the Egyptian representative proposed that the Council pass a recommendation on the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations. While Soviet propaganda from time to time has referred to the possibility of political and economic sanctions, mention of expulsion is rare: In a single known instance, an article in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS this June, by Dmitriyev and Ladeikin, cited Article 6 of the UN Charter as stating that a UN member which persistently violates Charter principles may be expelled from the organization.

Moscow has generally avoided addressing itself to the question of the ultimate status of Jerusalem, but the Koryavin IZVESTIYA article does recall UN decisions "establishing the status of Jerusalem as a separate entity enjoying a special international status." And a foreign-language commentary by Viktor Kudryavtsev on the 21st cites the 29 November 1947 UNGA resolution declaring Jerusalem, "which lies in Jordanian territory," a demilitarized, neutral city with a "special regime."

SUEZ CANAL INCIDENTS DRAW BRIEF MENTION, NO SOVIET COMMENT

Moscow gives only the barest acknowledgment of the 17-18 September incidents along the Suez Canal in terse reports citing an Egyptian military spokesman's statements. On the 17th, TASS promptly reported the downing of an Israeli Phantom, apparently failing to pick up Cairo's subsequent acknowledgment that the downed aircraft was an army transport plane. On the 18th, TASS again cited an Egyptian military spokesman for the report that Israeli planes had fired at Egyptian positions on the canal, and quoted AFP to the effect that an Israeli army spokesman had reported Israeli artillery fire on Egyptian antiaircraft missile positions. There was no mention of the Israeli charge that Egyptian missiles were fired at Israeli planes that day. And in a two-sentence report on the 21st, TASS said that according to AL-AHRAM, the Israeli military in the last few days had stepped up their military preparations on the east bank of the canal, and that movements of artillery units as well as activities of land and air forces had been observed.

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In the incident a week earlier, Moscow had likewise briefly reported an Egyptian military spokesman's statement that Israeli forces "fired on" an Egyptian military aircraft on the 11th; Israel claimed that an Egyptian Sukhoi-7 overflying Israeli-held territory on the west side of the canal had been shot down.

USSR SELECTIVELY REPORTS CAIRO DEVELOPMENTS, NOT JOINT TALKS

In keeping with its generally low level of comment on the Middle East question, Moscow is silent with respect to Cairo reports of Soviet-Egyptian consultations on the problem in the context of a "joint working paper." With regard to internal developments in the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE), TASS on the 9th noted publication of the ARE permanent constitution, adopted by referendum on the 11th, and reported formation of the new cabinet on the 19th, without mentioning that one of the new ministerial posts--that of minister of state for foreign affairs--would have "special responsibility" for Arab-Soviet relations. (Noting that Murad Ghalib, Cairo's ambassador to Moscow since 1961, was appointed to this new post, AL-AHRAM on the 19th pointed to his experience in the "intricacies" of Soviet-Egyptian relations, which it called a matter of "first priority.") Nor has Moscow as yet made mention of the planned observances in Cairo commemorating the first anniversary of Nasir's death, on 28 September.*

Perhaps suggestive of continued Soviet affront at Arab treatment of local "progressives," Podgorny in his 14 September Kremlin dinner speech decried attempts by "reaction and imperialism" to disunite the Arab countries, undermine them from within, and "strike a blow against the patriotic forces," and declared that the Soviet Union "will not be indifferent" with respect to these intrigues. In the same vein, Mayevskiy in the 19 September PRAVDA deplored attempts by imperialism and "internal reaction" to split the Arabs' front, attack the patriotic forces, and undermine friendly Arab relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow presumably has in mind the continuing Sudanese denunciations of communism, but may well also be thinking of the Egyptian trials of 'Ali Sabri and other former Nasir associates.

* Moscow could scarcely have been pleased by as-Sadat's condolence cable, publicized by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 12 September, on the death of Khrushchev, one of the "greatest leaders" of the Soviet Union who would be remembered in Egypt with "pride and appreciation."

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AS-SADAT SPEECH Reporting as-Sadat's 16 September radio and television statement to the nation, TASS noted his criticism of the United States for insisting that U.S.-Egyptian consultations were continuing and that there was hope of an early settlement despite the fact that there had been no contacts for over two months. An Arabic-language report of the speech additionally mentioned that as-Sadat denied U.S. "propaganda fabrications" concerning points of agreement between Cairo and Washington on a settlement and on Egypt's acceptance of a partial solution. The broadcast did not mention as-Sadat's statement that the United States "even said to the Soviet Union" that Egypt accepted a partial solution.

USSR-ARE TALKS, "JOINT PAPER" Cairo radio reported that after making his statement on the 16th, as-Sadat summoned Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov to study the situation in light of the "joint Soviet-Egyptian working paper which has been discussed in the past months," and in light of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty.* Cairo has shed no further light on the "working paper," and Moscow has made no reference to such a document. The communique on Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyadh's 15-20 April talks in Moscow did say the sides had agreed on unspecified "further joint steps" to normalize the Middle East situation. Such language was not unique to this communique, however; similar references to future joint steps had appeared in the communiques on Nasir's July 1968 and July 1970 visits to the USSR. A Dmitriyev article in the April INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS this year also referred to Soviet-Egyptian "contacts, coordination of positions, and joint actions" in the context of a search for a political settlement.

Cairo's AL-AHRAM on the 17th is the only source for a report that a "special diplomatic envoy from the Soviet Government" was due in Cairo that day to exchange views and information with Foreign Minister Riyadh, and the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY reported on the 19th that Riyadh had received Vinogradov, who was accompanied by an "ambassador at the Soviet Foreign Ministry."

* The Soviet-Egyptian treaty, signed in May, calls for regular consultations at various levels on important questions affecting the interests of both states, and says that in the event of developments creating a danger to or violation of peace, the sides will contact each other to concert their positions.

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UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

MOSCOW REVIEWS KEY AGENDA ITEMS, BACKS PRC'S SEATING

A moderate volume of Moscow comment and reportage on the 21 September opening of the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) focuses predictably on the USSR-sponsored agenda items calling for debate on implementation of the declaration on strengthening international security and for discussion of the question of a world disarmament conference. In its rundown of agenda items, available Soviet propaganda has assigned "top priority" to the debates on these two initiatives. A third agenda item suggested by the USSR--consideration of the Soviet draft treaty governing man's activities on the moon--is mentioned in current propaganda, but has not received the attention accorded the other proposals.

The propaganda has pointed to the importance of other disarmament issues on the agenda, including the questions of banning chemical and bacteriological weapons and the suspension of all nuclear tests. It notes that a "broad debate" on the Middle East will be held. And as in past years, it underscores the importance of fully implementing the declaration on granting independence to countries and peoples under colonial rule.

Soviet propaganda has touched only briefly on the question of U Thant's pending resignation from the post of secretary general. TASS noted on the 14th that in a press conference that day he said his decision was final; and a participant in the 19 September commentators' roundtable show in the domestic service, referring to the same press conference, said U Thant indicated that he would not remain in office "even for a limited period" after the end of his current term, which expires on 31 December. Moscow has not speculated on a possible successor to U Thant beyond noting the Secretary General's own views on the necessary qualifications: Reporting U Thant's remarks at a luncheon on the 17th, TASS said he indicated that a secretary general must have "an independent opinion and never become an agent of some one country or group of countries" and that he must display impartiality regardless of his nationality.

CHINESE SEATING Moscow continues to voice pro forma support for the restoration to the PRC of its "legitimate rights" in the United Nations and to call for the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek delegation, stressing the consistency of the

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USSR's position on these questions over the years. A commentary in Mandarin beamed to Southeast Asian listeners on the 21st, for example, asserted that the USSR's policy "has never wavered . . . despite the anti-Soviet and other antisocialist splittist activities conducted by the current Peking leaders." Like other Soviet comment, the broadcast went on to criticize "Washington's maneuverings" aimed at a "two-Chinas" solution. In the words of a participant in the 19 September commentators' roundtable, Washington is pushing for the passage of resolutions whose main aims are to keep "the Chiang Kai-shek mission in the United Nations while simultaneously making definite curtseys in the direction of Peking."

An international review article by PRAVDA's authoritative commentator Mayevskiy on the 19th is atypical in suggesting that the Chinese representation issue is less than crucial. After noting that the American press has vigorously played up U.S. efforts to keep Chiang in the United Nations while at the same time making goodwill gestures toward Peking, Mayevskiy says "some observers" have assumed that "the fuss surrounding the 'problem of Taiwan's representation' is an attempt to distract the Assembly's attention from truly important problems, and above all from the problem of disarmament."

Peking has remained adamant in its opposition to the concept of dual representation in the United Nations. In the month since the release of the 20 August PRC Foreign Ministry statement, which declared categorically that Peking "will absolutely have nothing to do with the United Nations" unless the Taiwan delegation is expelled, Chinese propaganda has publicized foreign support for the restoration of the PRC's "lawful rights" in the world body and for expulsion of the ROC delegates.

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USSR - AFGHANISTAN

COMMUNIQUE ON KING'S VISIT REFLECTS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP

The joint communique issued at the end of the 14-19 September visit to the Soviet Union of Afghanistan's King Mohammed Zahir Shah reflected the highly satisfactory state of Afghan-Soviet relations, proclaimed Soviet intent to assist Afghanistan in its fourth five-year development plan, and registered "a coincidence or closeness of positions" between the two countries "on the major problems of the present-day international situation." On East Pakistan, the two sides "exchanged views," and their jointly expressed "hope" in regard to conditions for the refugees' return was stated in terms considerably milder than the previously outlined Soviet position. During his stay in Moscow the king and his entourage engaged in a series of talks with several top Soviet political and economic leaders, including Podgorny, Mazurov, Gromyko, Skachkov, and Kuzmin, and met with Brezhnev on the 15th. The king's invitations to Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin to pay return visits to Afghanistan "at a time convenient for them" were "accepted with gratitude." Following a two-day visit to Irkutsk, the king continued on to Ulan Bator on the 20th for an official visit to Mongolia.

BILATERAL RELATIONS Soviet publicity for the visit, speeches by Podgorny and the Afghan king, and the joint communique portrayed Soviet-Afghan relations as a model of long-standing friendship, good-neighborly cooperation, and peaceful coexistence. On the day of the king's arrival PRAVDA described him as an "outstanding statesman" who was making a "great contribution to strengthening the relations of friendship and good-neighborliness between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union." Speaking as the host at a dinner on the 14th, Podgorny said that Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were linked by "bonds of friendship, good-neighborliness, and multifaceted mutually advantageous cooperation," and he observed that meetings and exchange of opinions between leaders of the two countries had become "traditional"--a "testimony" to the "high level of development" of bilateral relations. Citing the bilateral treaties of 1921 and 1931, the king in his speech declared that Afghan-Soviet relations were a striking example of fruitful peaceful coexistence in the field of international ties, especially between countries which have different political and social systems."

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In a similar vein, the communique expressed "deep satisfaction" with the state of bilateral relations and "great satisfaction" at the marking earlier this year of the 50th anniversary of the 1921 treaty of friendship and of the 40th anniversary of the 1931 treaty of neutrality and nonaggression. Noting both sides' desire to strengthen further Soviet-Afghan friendship and "reciprocally advantageous cooperation," the communique recorded that discussions had taken place on further expanding trade relations and economic and technical cooperation, that subsequent talks in Kabul would focus on means of Soviet assistance to the 1972-1977 fourth five-year development plan of Afghanistan, and that negotiations later this year would be aimed at concluding a new long-term trade agreement.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Afghanistan's foreign policy received similar accolades. Noting that the "mutual understanding and trust which have so characterized Soviet-Afghan relations for decades past" are spreading to cooperation in the international sphere, Podgornyy said the Soviet people "regard with approval" Afghanistan's policy of "positive and active neutrality" and its support of peoples' struggles against colonialism. Claiming a "coincidence or proximity of positions" between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on major international problems, Podgornyy expounded in routine terms on Indochina, the East Pakistan situation, the Middle East, European security, and problems of disarmament and arms control. **In his return speech the Afghan king touched on all these issues with the exception of the East Pakistan situation.**

The communique treated in similar terms a number of international issues on which it was claimed that there was a "coincidence or closeness" of positions. The Soviet side "highly assessed" Afghanistan's policy of nonalignment; both sides declared their "full support" for the declaration on strengthening international security adopted by the UNGA on 16 December 1970; arms control and disarmament measures were supported, as was the convocation "in the nearest future" of an all-European security conference. Calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina and a political settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords, the communique registered the contention that "there exist at present real prerequisites" for an Indochina settlement. Podgornyy on the 14th had asserted that the PRG's seven-point proposal and the proposals of "the patriotic forces" of Laos and Cambodia had created "real preconditions" for a "just

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settlement in Southeast Asia." The "continuing dangerous situation in the Middle East," said the communique, "results from Israel's aggressive policy"; a "just and lasting peace" there can be established on the basis of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the full implementation of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution. Racism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism were also condemned by the communique.

CRISIS IN
EAST PAKISTAN

On the subject of the East Pakistan crisis, the communique revealed a degree of disagreement and its wording reflected a compromise. Using carefully selected straightforward terms, the communique noted that the sides "exchanged views" on the "serious situation in the Asian subcontinent" resulting from "the events in East Pakistan" and which has led to the flow of millions of refugees from Pakistan to India. The communique registered the hope that "conditions will soon be created in East Pakistan to enable the Pakistani refugees to return to their country in full confidence of their safety."

Such phraseology is significantly milder than the Soviet position, which Podgorny in essence reiterated in his speech on the 14th. Referring to the "well-known events" in East Pakistan and the resulting increase in Indian-Pakistani tensions, Podgorny contended that "there are forces"--unnamed--"which are not above utilizing the tense situation that has been created to implement their own unseemly aims and to kindle armed clashes in the region." He went on to reiterate the Soviet line calling for "the speediest possible achievement of a political settlement" in East Pakistan "taking account of the legitimate interests of its population," for "the creation of secure conditions there for the return of the refugees," and for Indian and Pakistani leaders "to prevent the occurrence of a slide toward military conflict." In this context Podgorny recalled the recently concluded Soviet-Indian treaty on peace, friendship, and cooperation--"which is not aimed against any state."

The Soviet position favoring a "political solution" involving "the legitimate interests of the population"--a clear allusion to the overwhelming electoral victory in East Pakistan of Sheik Mujibur Rahman's now illegal Awami League--is not reflected in the communique; and the "creation of secure conditions" for the return of the refugees is watered down to the creation of conditions enabling the refugees to return "in full confidence of their safety." In his return speech the Afghan king did not mention the East Pakistan situation.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PEKING SILENT ON REPORT THAT NATIONAL DAY PARADE CANCELED

There has been no reflection in PRC media of Western news reports that the traditional National Day parade in Peking will not take place this year and that airplane flights in China were halted for several days last week. PRC broadcast patterns reflect no anomalies, either on the part of Peking or provincial radios. All provincial radios except Inner Mongolia, which ceased broadcasting local political materials in January 1970, continue to carry their usual local programs. The media reflected relatively few public appearances by top PRC leaders between 12 and 17 September, indicating the possibility of a leadership conference; it has been a year since the last party plenum, and plenums are traditionally held before NPC meetings.

The content of Peking broadcasts has been fairly standard for this time of year. There have been numerous economic claims in anticipation of National Day, and the anniversary of Mao's 15 September 1965 instruction on broadcasting has received the usual voluminous coverage, perhaps even a little more than usual. Several articles on economics, continuing to criticize ultraleft notions, do not indicate any change in the relatively moderate policies of recent years.

Peking's buildup for National Day festivities has varied from year to year, although a parade has always been held. In 1970 the media did not announce beforehand that any provincial leaders had journeyed to Peking for the celebration, and did not note specifically that foreign groups in Peking were to attend National Day functions until a report on 28 September stated that an Overseas Chinese group was en route to attend.

WIRED BROADCASTING NET REPORTEDLY FAR ADVANCED IN CHINA

On 15 September, the sixth anniversary of Mao's inscription on radio broadcasting, NCNA reported that the wired broadcasting network is "vigorously developing" in China's countryside. "Almost all" counties and municipalities in China now have their own radio stations, and wired broadcasting has been installed "in more than 96 percent of the nation's production brigades and more than 87 percent of the production teams."

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Comparable figures on a national scale for recent years are not available. NCNA did report in August 1963 that 80 percent of China's counties had at that time set up their own radio stations. Previous figures available for selected provinces indicate that more populous provinces in the east had already achieved the 90 percent level at this time last year. Shantung reported wired broadcasting facilities for 97 percent of its production teams at the end of last year; in April 1969 only 60 percent of its teams had possessed such facilities. Kiangsi reported wired broadcasting for 98 percent of its production brigades and 90 percent of its production teams in September 1970; in September 1969 the comparable figures were 90 percent and 60 percent. By September 1970 Liaoning had installed wired broadcasting for 90 percent of its production teams. On the other hand, Kansu had installed such facilities for only 53 percent of its teams by September 1970.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

PRC SUSTAINS DIFFERENTIATED LINE ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

Moves in August portending improved Chinese relations with Burma and Malaysia at the state level have produced no essential changes in Peking's dual-level propaganda tactics toward these countries, marked by restraint in PRC official media while the national administrations are subjected to continuing abuse in broadcasts of the Chinese-sponsored clandestine radios.

While on one level Peking received Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win on a well-publicized visit from 6 to 12 August and sent a Chinese trade delegation to Malaysia from 22 to 28 August,* the Chinese-sponsored clandestine radios backing the insurgent movements in those countries--the Voice of the People of Burma (VPB) and Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR)--were pulling in an opposite direction by impugning the motives of the two Southeast Asian regimes in their dealings with the Chinese. VPB broadcasts on 5 and 8 August, just before and during Ne Win's sojourn in Peking, suggested that the "Ne Win military clique" was seeking improved relations with the PRC in order to shore up its tenuous position at home and that the visit did not signify any ideological metamorphosis on Ne Win's part. The VOMR suggested that "Razak and his ilk" were acting out of similar motives of expediency in receiving the Chinese trade delegation.

Peking media have carried no followup propaganda on Ne Win's visit or, for that matter, on any aspect of Burmese affairs since the visit. PRC official media do not carry VPB material. Peking does air material originating with the Voice of the Malayan Revolution, but almost invariably over the past year has sanitized it to exclude direct attacks on the Malaysian Government. Thus in the period since the PRC trade delegation returned home, NCNA on 4 and 5 September carried excerpts of

* Propaganda on the Ne Win visit is reviewed in the TRENDS of 18 August, pages 23-26, and treatment of the PRC trade delegation's visit to Malaysia in the TRENDS of 1 September, pages 34-36.

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VOMR comment describing the "Malayan people's revolutionary struggle," with derogatory references to the Malaysian leadership edited out.

BACKGROUND: PROPAGANDA ON THE INSURGENT MOVEMENTS

The most recent of Peking's periodic roundups of revolutionary armed struggles in Southeast Asia--a 19 May NCNA correspondent's report issued in connection with the first anniversary of Mao's 20 May 1970 statement on the inevitability of world revolution--provided a standard list of countries in the area where armed struggles endorsed by Peking are taking place: Burma, Thailand, "Malaya," the Philippines, Indonesia, and "North Kalimantan" (East Malaysia). Peking has since sustained a differentiated approach to these noncommunist Southeast Asian countries, ranging from hardline propaganda on Thailand through gradations of moderation on Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines to the most restrained line on Burma. Peking also follows a two-pronged approach toward the individual countries, making use of three clandestine radios--the Voice of the People of Thailand, the Voice of the Malayan Revolution, and the Voice of the People of Burma--to support the insurgent movements while observing diplomatic constraints in its own official media.

The official PRC media provide a channel for both original comment on the Southeast Asian countries and further dissemination of material taken from the clandestine stations, the media of other communist countries, and some noncommunist sources. Publicity for resident leaders of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) offers another means for Peking to show support for communist insurgencies.

THAILAND As a U.S. ally repeatedly censured for its role in the Indochina conflict, Thailand is the target of Peking's most abusive and extensive propaganda attacks. The communist-led Thai insurgents get propaganda support from both the official PRC media and the clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand. The communist insurgency received considerable attention in early August in comment marking the sixth anniversary of the launching of armed struggle against the "Thanom clique" and the United States. A connection between the insurgent movement and the Indochina conflict is frequently pointed up in references to support provided the communist cause in Indochina by the armed actions of the insurgents in Thailand.

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Peking media have not acknowledged recent calls by Thai government and business spokesmen for cautious steps toward normalization of relations with the PRC. However, a 13 September NCNA summary of a commentary by the clandestine radio denouncing Thai support for a "two-Chinas" position in the United Nations was notable for a call for normalizing Sino-Thai relations. The commentary demanded that "the Thanom-Praphat clique" cease its "hostile" policy toward the PRC, "abolish the fascist law that bans trade with China," and "restore normal relations" with the PRC. These themes were developed at length in a 7 September broadcast by the clandestine radio claiming that there is strong popular sentiment for friendly relations with the PRC. The broadcast said that even some parliamentarians have called for repeal of the law prohibiting trade with the PRC and that the chairman of the Thai Chamber of Commerce spoke of the benefits from such trade. NCNA did not mention this broadcast.

PHILIPPINES In the absence of a clandestine radio, Peking's infrequent reports on the Philippine insurgency provide little propaganda support for the communist-led Philippine New People's Army. NCNA reports on 28 August and 4 September--attributed to Philippine communist and other sources--telling of a successful action by the New People's Army against "the reactionary troops" was the first monitored Peking coverage of the Philippine insurgents since 28 June. Peking has abstained from commenting on the insurgency in its own name and has carefully avoided direct attacks on the Marcos government in carrying material attributed to other sources.

Extending recognition to the Peking-oriented wing of the Philippine communists, NCNA on 10 July carried a message on the CCP's 50th anniversary from "Comrade Amado Guerro, chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines." Replete with accolades to "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" and condemnations of deviationist lines, the message referred briefly to the Philippine communist struggle but refrained from attacking the Marcos government by name.

Publicity for the Philippine communists was provided by the Voice of the Malayan Revolution on 15 September when it belatedly carried a 23 June statement by the Philippine CP Central Committee alleging a massacre of Moslems. The statement denounced "the Marcos fascist clique" and called for the minorities to join with the New People's Army in applying Mao's people's war precepts and to practice guerrilla warfare.

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INDONESIA Peking has offered little propaganda support for the PKI in recent months. Infrequent PRC comment on Indonesian affairs in general has censured the government for its relations with the United States and Japan. One such commentary on 27 April denounced the "Suharto fascist military clique," but the last monitored commentary on this subject--on 9 May--softened the characterization to "the Indonesian Suharto military regime."

Peking's only propaganda support for the Indonesian communists has consisted of publicity for two PKI documents signed by Jusuf Adjitorop, head of the PKI's resident delegation in Peking. A 2 July message to the CCP on its 50th anniversary and a 4 July statement on the previous day's elections in Indonesia, both carried by NCNA, proclaimed the importance of communist-led armed insurgency in Indonesia and attacked the "Suharto fascist military regime." NCNA did not mention Adjitorop's presence at the 31 July PLA anniversary reception, an event at which he was reported to be a guest of honor the previous year.

MALAYSIA The two levels of Peking's propaganda approach are most sharply defined in its treatment of Malaysia. On the one hand, it has publicized the exchange of trade delegations, in the process acknowledging the legitimacy of the federation by using its official name of Malaysia. On the other hand, PRC media continue to disseminate material from the Voice of the Malayan Revolution detailing the activities of the armed insurgents in both East and West Malaysia, while carefully excluding the clandestine radio's direct attacks on the Malaysian leaders.

The Voice of the Malayan Revolution has served as a forum for pro-Peking communist parties throughout Southeast Asia, including both those without their own clandestine radios--as illustrated by the VOMR's broadcast of the 23 June statement by the Philippine CP--and those having clandestine stations of their own. This clearinghouse role was acknowledged by the Voice of the People of Burma on 16 September in noting that both the VOMR and the Voice of the People of Thailand broadcast material originating with the Burmese clandestine radio.

BURMA Peking has never acknowledged the existence of the Voice of the People of Burma, which continues to air regular attacks on the Ne Win regime. The most recent reference to the Burmese insurgent movement in PRC media was contained in the BCP's message on the CCP's 50th anniversary,

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carried by NCNA on 3 July. The message called for victory over "the Ne Win regime." There has been no comment in Peking's own name on the armed insurgency in Burma since September 1970.

The last Chinese reference to the BCP's resident delegation in Peking was contained in NCNA's report on the PLA anniversary reception on 31 July. NCNA reported on 31 July--the same day it carried the announcement of Ne Win's impending visit--that Ba Thein Tin, vice chairman of the BCP Central Committee, had been among the "distinguished guests on the seats of honor" at the reception. Pe Tint, another member of the BCP delegation, was also reported present.

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